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THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT
OF 1965 AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Federal government proposals and programs for direct or indirect
financial aid in some form to religious institutions has been a recurrent
source of controversy. Such government spending may be criticized as
violating the "Establishment" Clause" to the first amendment which
says "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of re-
ligion."' The Clause was held applicable to the states through the four-
teenth amendment.2 In the past there have been many aids to religion,
some of which were referred to by Mr. Justice Douglas (quoting from
Fellman, The Limits of Freedom (1959), pp. 40-41) in Engle v. Vitale:'
There are many "aids" to religion in this country at all levels
of government. . . . N.Y.A. and W.P.A. funds were available
to parochial schools during the depression. Veterans receiving
money under the "G.I." Bill of 1944 could attend denomina-
tional schools, to which payments were made directly by the
government. During World War II, federal money was con-
tributed to denominational schools for the training of nurses.
The benefits of the National School Lunch Act are available to
students in private as well as public schools. The Hospital
Survey and Construction Act of 1946 specifically made money
available to non-public hospitals. . . . Religious organizations
are exempt from the federal income tax and are granted postal
privileges. Up to defined limits . . . contributions to religious
organizations are deductible for federal income tax purposes.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. There are two problems concerning the first amendment
which will not be discussed in this note, First, the Court in interpreting the
first amendment has referred to historical evidence. The existing meaning given
to the amendment by the Court will be applied in this note to the issues raised by the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. For a discussion of the history
of the first amendment see Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-12 (1947) and app.
Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments; STOKES AND PFEFFER,
CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 83-104 (1964); Corwin, The Supreme
Court as National School Board, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 3 (1949); O'Neill, Non-
preferential Aid to Religion Is Not An Establishment of Religion, 2 BUFFALO L. REV.
242 (1953) ; and Pfeffer, No Law Respecting An Establishment of Religiol, 2 BuFFALO,
L. REv. 225 (1953).
Second, is the problem of whether a person will have standing to challenge the act.
Such an action must satisfy the requirements of Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923), which held that a federal taxpayer as such cannot challenge congressional
legislation. See Recent Statute, 77 HAv. L. REv. 1353, 1358 (1964) ; see also Comment,
69 YALE L.J. 895, 915 (1960).
2. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
3. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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.... This list of federal "aids" could be expanded and of course
there is a long list in each state."
Two legislative enactments should be added to this list. The National
Defense Education Act of 1958 makes loans available to non-profit pri-
vate schools for the acquisition of equipment to provide education in sci-
ence, mathematics, and foreign languages.' Private as well as public in-
stitutions of higher learning may receive funds to construct academic
facilities pursuant to the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963.6 The
statutes involving federal aid to education have apparently been accepted
without litigation of the religious questions.7
Congress revived this church-state issue in 1965 by enacting
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act.' Title I provides funds
to the states to distribute to their local educational agencies to supplement
or innovate programs to meet the needs of educationally deprived chil-
dren.' Before a state may approve the educational agency's program, the
4. Id. at 437, n.l.
5. 72 Stat. 1580 (1958), 20 U.S.C. §§ 401, 445 (1964).
6. 77 Stat. 363 (1963), 20 U.S.C. §§ 701, 714 (1964). In defining "academic
facilities" the act excludes:
* * . any facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place
of religious worship, or . . . any facility which (although not a facility
described in the preceding clause) is used or to be used primarily in connection
with part of the program of a school or department of di'inity. . . . For the
purposes of this subparagraph, the term "school or department of divinity"
means an institution, or a department or branch of an institution, whose
program is specifically for the education of students to prepare them to become
ministers of religion or to enter upon some other religious vocation or to
prepare them to teach theological subjects.
20 U.S.C. §§ 751(a) (2) (C), (D), (E).
7. A Maryland statute which is similar to the Higher Education Facilities Act of
1963 in providing grants to colleges, including church affilated higher institutions,
for the construction of science buildings, dormitories, dinirg halls, and classroom
buildings was held constitutional under the State and Federel Constitutions. Horace
Mann League v. Tawes, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 2526 (Md. Cir. Ct. Mar. 11, 1965).
8. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
9. 79 Stat. 27, Title 1 (1965). Title I amends 64 Stat. 1100 (1950), 20
U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1964) which provides financial assistance for areas affected
by federal activities. The provisions in that act are codified into a TITLE I-FINANCIAL
ASSISTANCE FOR LOCAL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES IN AREAS AFFECTED BY FEDERAL
ACITvIY. The Education Act adds to the preceding act TITLE II-FINANcIAL ASSIST-
ANCE TO LocALL EDUCATIONAL AGENCIES FOR THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN OF Low-
INCOME FAmILIES. Generally, the amount of funds an educational agency will receive
is equal to the federal percentage of the average per pupil expenditure in the state
multiplied by the number of children aged five to seventeen in the school district of
the agency, of families having an annual income of less than the low-income factor.
For the year ending June 30, 1966, the federal percentage is fifty per cent and the low-
income factor is $2,000. Generally to be eligible for a grant under the title the
number of children between the ages of five and seventeen of families having an
income less than the low-income factor must be at least 100 or equal to 3 per cent of all
the children the ages of 5 and 17 in the school district of the educational agency. In
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act requires that provision be made for the participation of educationally
deprived children attending private schools."0 Title II provides funds to
the states to acquire library resources, textbooks, and other printed and
published instructional material for the use of children in public and pri-
vate elementary and secondary schools." Title III authorizes the Com-
missioner of Education to make grants directly to local educational agen-
cies within a state to construct or operate supplementary educational cen-
ters and perform supplementary services." The Commissioner may only
make a grant after determining that the program provides for the par-
ticipation of children attending non-profit private schools.' Title IV
authorizes the Commissioner to make grants to universities and colleges,
including such private non-profit institutions, for the purpose of advanc-
ing research in the field of education.'4
Congress has attempted by the act to improve the education of pri-
vate school children through implementing publicly sponsored programs
instead of giving direct financial or other aid to the parochial schools."
Supreme Court decisions concerning aid to religious institutions or to re-
the latter case there must be at least ten such educationally deprived children in the
school district. See generally, Title I § 203.
10. Section 205(a) (2). Title I, 79 Stat. 30, 31 (1965), amending 64 Stat. 1100
(1950), 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1964).
A local educational agency may receive a basic grant . . . under this title for
any fiscal year only upon application therefore approved by the appropriate
State educational agency, upon its determination (Emphasis added.) (consistent
with such basic criteria as the Commissioner may establish) . . . that, to the
extent consistent with the number of educationally deprived children in the
school district of the local educational agency who are enrolled in private
elementary and secondary schools, such agency has made provision for including
special educational services and arrangements (such as dual enrollment, educa-
tional radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment) in
which such children can participate; . . .
11. Section 201, 79 Stat. 36, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 821-827 (Supp. 1965). This title in
§ 204(b) provides that in any state with an approved plan in which no agency is
authorized by law to distribute the educational materials, the Commissioner will make
arrangements for such distributions. Apparently, this means the federal government
may do what state agencies are prohibited from doing so long as there is an approved
state plan.
12. Section 301, 79 Stat. 39, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 848 (Supp. 1965).
13. Section 304(b) (3) (B), 79 Stat. 39, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 844(b) (3) (B)
(Supp. 1965). This requirement is similar to § 205(a) (2) in Title I except this title
refers to children enrolled in non-profit private schools. See note 66 infra.
14. Section 401, 79 Stat. 44, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 331a (Supp. 1965), amending
68 Stat. 533 (1954), 20 U.S.C. § 332 (1964). Title V in the new act does not raise any
church-state issues and will not be discussed in this Note. Title V provides federal
funds to aid in strengthening State Departments of Education.
15. This is evidenced by the provisions in Title I and III which provide for public
control of the programs 'but require that provision be made for the participation of
private school children. See note 9 & 13 supra and accompanying text. Title II makes
textbooks and other educational materials available to students and teachers. See
note 72 infra. No funds are given to a religious school except in Title IV.
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ligion, though few, provide some precedents to resolve the controversial
issues raised by the act. The Supreme Court has only examined two
cases involving state financial or other aid to private schools or their
students."0
In Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ." the Court sustained a
statute which as construed by the state court permitted the spending of
public funds to purchase textbooks to loan to students attending private
as well as public schools. The Louisiana statute was challenged as vio-
lating the fourteenth amendment instead of the first amendment. 8
The petitioners contended that the state used private property collected
through taxation for a private purpose. Disagreeing with their con-
tention, the Court held the purpose was public because (1) the books
were for the use of the children and not the parochial school, (2) the
parochial schools did not receive any funds, and (3) the books were non-
sectarian. This reasoning has been referred to as the child benefit the-
ory" and broadly construed means that when the child directly receives
the benefits, the legislation is constitutional.
Another principle, similar to the child benefit theory, is that legisla-
tion enacted to improve the general welfare of the community is valid
under the first amendment. The Court used this theory in Everson v.
Bd. of Educ.'° to sustain a city ordinance (enacted pursuant to a New Jer-
sey statute) which provided the reimbursement to parents of funds ex-
pended in transporting their children to and from public and private non-
profit schools. The majority, speaking through Mr. Justice Black,
adopted the following interpretation of the "Establishment Clause" to the
first amendment:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church.
16. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930); Everson v.
Bd. of Educ., 310 U.S. 1 (1947). There are other cases in which the Court has had
the opportunity to apply the principles of the "Establishment Cl iuse," but they concerned
religious indoctrination or religious exercises. Since the fact situations in those cases
differ from the kind of case which is expected to challenge .-his act, they are treated
separately. See text accompanying notes 91-126 infra.
17. Cochran v. Louisiana State Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930).
18. This distinction is important to note for precedential reasons. The case was
decided before the "Establishment Clause" was held applicable to the states through
the fourteenth amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Today,
the Court could arrive at an opposite result in deciding a sirailar textbook statute by
distinguishing Cochran on this point. Though a purpose, i.e., education, may be public,
the means adopted towards its advancement could be unconstitutional under the proscrip-
tions of the first amendment.
19. See FELLMAN, RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIc LAW 76 (1965); La Noue,
The Child Benefit Theory Revisited: Textbooks, Transportotion, and Medical Care,
13 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAw 76, 79 (1964).
20. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor in-
fluence a person to go or remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.
No person can be punished for entertaining or professing re-
ligious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied
to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever, they
may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or groups or vice versa. In the words of Jeffer-
son, the clause against the establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect a wall of separation between Church and
State. 1
Although this statement of principle may still be the subject of contro-
versy,22 the Court at least endorsed an interpretation of the first amend-
ment which prohibits Congress or a state from doing more things than
establishing or supporting a church and even restricts the granting of
non-preferential aid to all religions.
The majority held that the city ordinance did not violate the above
announced principles. Instead they considered the plan as a gen-
eral welfare program23 to provide for the safe transportation of students
to and from school. The justices reasoned that this program was analo-
gous to the benefits received by religious institutions from police, fire,
and sanitation protection provided for by the city. The majority then
concluded that since the amendment required a state to be neutral be-
tween religion and irreligion, a person should not be deprived of public
welfare benefits because of his beliefs or disbeliefs. Mr. Justice Black
emphasized the fact that the parochial school did not receive any money,
though he conceded that such transportation services incidentally could
increase private school enrollments.24
21. Id. at 15-16.
22. There is concern as to whether these principles bar aid to religious in-
stitutions or merely to religion as such. See note 120 infra and accompanying text
and see KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 62, 66 (1964).
23. The Court did not mention the child benefit theory in the opinion. However
there appears to be no substantial differences between the results achieved through
applying either the child benefit theory or the general welfare argument.
24. 330 U.S. 1, 17-18.
Measured by these standards, we cannot say the First Amendment prohibits
New Jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay the bus fares of parochial
school pupils as a part of a general program under which it pays the fares of
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The dissenting Justices agreed with the majority's interpretation of
the first amendment but disagreed with their appl cation of the prin-
ciples to the city ordinance." Mr. Justice Jackson described the alleged
inconsistency when he said of the majority, "The case which irresistibly
comes to mind as the most fitting precedent is that of Julia who, accord-
ing to Byron's reports, 'whispering "I will ne'er consent"-consented.' ""
There is some question whether the Everson decision is still good law.
Mr. Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion to Engle v. Fitale said that
the Everson decision appeared to be inconsistent with the first amend-
ment because public funds were minimally used to aid religion." Douglas
was one of the five-man majority to sustain the transportation ordinance.
Without further examination of the similar theories advanced in
Cochran and Everson, one can easily be convinced that the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act is constitutional per se. First, the act's
pupils attending public and other schools. It is undoubtedly true that children
are helped to get to church schools. . . Moreover, ;tate-paid policemen,
detailed to protect children going to and from church schools from the very
real hazards of traffic, would serve much the same purpose and accomplish
much the same result as state provisions intended to guarantee free transporta-
tion of a kind which the state deems to be best for the school children's welfare.
And parents might refuse to risk their children to the serious danger of traffic
accidents going to and from parochial schools, the approsches to which were
not protected by policemen. Similarly, parents might be reluctant to permit
their children to attend schools which the state had cut off from such general
government services as ordinary police and fire protection, connections for
sewage disposal, public highways and sidewalks. Of courst, cutting off church
schools from these services, so separate and so indisputably marked off from
the religious function, would make it far more difficult for the schools to
operate. But such is obviously not the purpose of the First Amendment.
See also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. infra note 85.
25. There were four dissenting Justices, and two opinions were written respectively
by Mr. Justices Jackson and Rutledge. Rutledge was of the opinion that the general
welfare argument advanced by the majority ignored the religious factor. A person
should not be taxed to support religious beliefs with which he may disagree. 330 U.S.
1, Rutledge, J., dissenting at 28.
26. 330 U.S. 1, Jackson, J., dissenting at 18, 19.
27. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), Douglas, J., concurring at 437. Douglas'
reason for invalidating the New York State's Board of Regent's Prayer was that the
use of teachers in administering the prayer recitals, was some form of financial aid
to religion, though the time consumed was only minimal. He said of Everson at 443,
My problem today would be uncomplicated but for Everson v. Board of Educa-
tion . . .which allowed taxpayers' money to be used to p ay "the bus fares of
parochial school pupils as a part of a general program under which" the fares
of pupils attending public and other schools were also paid. The Eversonr case
seems in retrospect to be out of line with the First Amndment. (Emphasis
added.) Its result is appealing, as it allows aid to be given to needy children.
Yet by the same token, public funds could be used to satisfy other needs of
children in parochial schools-lunches, books, and tuition beinig obvious examples.
Clearly, Justice Douglas is not taking issue with the principle3 announced in Everson,
but he is objecting to the specific holding in the case.
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primary object is to improve the quality of the American educational sys-
tem.2" Certainly educational improvements enhance the nation's general
welfare. Second, no funds are given to a parochial elementary or sec-
ondary school.29 Since the private school children directly benefit from
the publicly sponsored programs, the most that can be said for the paro-
chial schools is that they are indirectly benefitted. Finally, none of the
federal funds can be used for religious worship or instruction."
For either the child benefit theory or general welfare argument to
have a meaningful constitutional significance they must be limited in
their application in future cases. In using either principle, the Court
has placed form over substance. Programs which are permissible under
the first amendment when the aid is given to the child or its parents are
perhaps unconstitutional when the school directly receives the aid for the
same purpose. Certainly any support or grant whether given to the
school or the child is for the benefit of the child and improves the general
welfare. When the Court uses the child benefit or general welfare rea-
soning, the result depends on who is the immediate beneficiary of the
program instead of the consequences of the legislative action. The child
or parent merely serves as a conduit for what could otherwise be un-
constitutional. Assuming that public tuition payments given directly to a
parochial school to defray the entire cost of educating each student is un-
constitutional,3 either principle could be used to sustain such payments
if made to the student.
A broad application of the child benefit theory or general welfare
argument permits legislation to do indirectly what apparently may not be
28. The preamble to the act states the purpose is "An Act to strengthen and
improve educational quality and educational opportunities in the Nation's elementary
and secondary schools." Pub. L. No. 89-10; 79 Stat. 27 (1965). See notes 112-115 infra
and accompanying text.
29. See note 15 szpra and accompanying text.
30. Section 605, 79 Stat. 58, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 881, 885 (Supp. 1965) provides:
Nothing contained in this Act shall be construed to authorize the making of
any payment under this Act, or under any Act amended by this Act, for
religious worship or instruction.
31. In Swart v. South Burlington Town School Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 167 A.2d 514,
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925 (1961), the court held a program providing tuition payments
to parochial schools violated the "Establishment Clause" of the first amendment and
the State Constitution. Pursuant to a state statute, the school district transferred its
obligation of providing secondary educational facilities to schools not within its control.
The children's parents were free to choose any school and the District provided tuition
to the schools for those children attending.
Although the denial of certiorari is not a decision on the merits of the case, there
is language in Everson and Cochran to indicate such direct grants to the parochial school
are unconstitutional. See note 85 infra. The program invalidated in Swart did not
distinguish between payments for secular academic instruction and grants for religious
instruction. Such a distinction perhaps will be significant to the Court.
THE EDUCATION ACT OF 1965
done directly." In using them one can easily miss the real issue, which
is the nature of the benefit and its relationship to the "Establishment
Clause." If the benefit substitutes an otherwise educational cost to the
parochial school, the program would violate the principles announced in
Everson. The immediate recipient of the benefit becc mes irrelevant when
the program results in the above consequence. -r. Justice Rutledge, in
his dissent in Everson,3 said that the first amendment prohibits the pub-
lic support of any educational cost to a parochial school. He did not see
any distinction between paying transportation e -penses and paying
teachers' salaries, purchasing academic equipment, or financing the con-
struction of educational buildings."1  Whether one agrees that trans-
portation to school is an educational cost, underlying Rutledge's dissent
was the admonition that the general welfare argument could be used to
sustain any aid to a parochial school."
If the Court analyzes the Education Act of 1965 in terms of the
child benefit theory or general welfare argument (another approach the
Court may use in determining the act's constitutionality will be suggested
subsequently)," Everson must be limited to its specific facts." The na-
ture of the benefit must be the point of focus instead of the beneficiaries.
32. See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
33. 330 U.S. 1, Rutledge, J., dissenting at 28.
34. 330 U.S. 1 Rutledge, J., dissenting at 48.
Payment of transportation is no more, nor is it any the less essential to
education, whether religious or secular, than payment for tuitions, for teachers'
salaries, for buildings, equipment and necessary materials. Nor is it any the
less directly related, in a school giving religious instruclion, to the primary
religious objective all those essential items are intended to achieve. No rational
line can be drawn between payment for such larger, but not more necessary,
items and payments for transportation. The only line that can be so drawn is
one between more dollars and less. Certainly in this realri such a line can be
no valid constiutional measure.
35. 330 U.S. 1, Rutledge, J., dissenting at 57.
As will be noted, the one gloss is contradicted by the facts of record and the
other is of whole cloth with the "public function" argument's excision of the
religious factor. But most important is that this approacb, if valid, supplies a
ready method for nullifying the Amendment's guaranty, not only for this case
and others involving small grants in aid for religions education, but equally for
larger ones. (Emphasis added.) The only thing needed vill be for the Court
again to transplant the "public welfare-public function" view from its proper
nonreligious due process bearing to the First Amendment application, holding
that religious education is not "supported" though it rray be aided by the
appropriation, and that the cause of education generally is furthered by helping
the pupil to secure that type of training.
36. See note 110 infra and accompanying text.
37. The New Jersey transportation program should be considered as a non-
educational cost. The Court should not extend the gener Ll welfare argument to
sustain all "aids" to parochial schools. To do so would be inconsistent with the
principles announced by the majority.
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Benefits coming within the category of educational costs are unconsti-
tutional. But Everson would sustain the public giving of what has been
referred to as "true welfare" '38 benefits such as vaccinations, medical
treatment, dental care, school lunches, and health programs. The kind of
benefit is determinative, and attendance at a given school is constitution-
ally insignificant. The fact that a child attends a school is relevant only
as to the convenience of the location for distributing the benefits to him.
A true welfare benefit is equivalent to the services a state may provide
under its police power except the payment of educational costs.3"
As previously mentioned, the Court could sustain nearly all the pro-
visions in the Education Act by broadly applying the child benefit theory
or the related general welfare argument. But the practical interpreta-
tion of these theories can only assure the constitutionality of some of the
act's contemplated programs and relegate others to an area of uncertainty.
Title I requires the local educational agency to provide "special edu-
cational services and arrangements" in which educationally deprived
school children who are enrolled in private elementary and secondary
schools may participate.4" The act does not specifically enumerate the
kinds of services but gives the examples of dual enrollment, educational
radio and television, and mobile educational services and equipment.4
The Rules and Regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Educa-
tion, though not inclusive, extend this permissive list to therapeutic, re-
medial, and welfare services which include broadened health services,
school breakfasts for poor children, and guidance and counselling serv-
ices." The legislative history indicates a congressional intent to allow
each educational agency to innovate or implement programs to meet the
special needs of the community.4" Since the language of Title I does not
38. See STOKES & PFEFFER, op. cit. supra note 1, at 432-33. In speaking about
public financial aid to advance secular instruction in parochial schools, the authors
said, "Free lunches, provided under the National School Lunch Act of 1946, and
health and dental care, stand on a different footing. These are universally considered
truly welfare benefits (Emphasis added.) for the children, rather than educational aid
to the schools."
39. The reason for this interpretation is that although payment of educational costs
advance the public welfare, the first amendment is violated because of the payments'
effect on religion or religious institutions.
40. Section 205 (a) (2), Title I, 79 Stat. 30, 31 (1965) amending 64 Stat. 1100
(1950), 20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1964). This provision is quoted at note 10 supra.
41. Section 205(a) (2), Title I, 79 Stat. 31 (1965), amending 64 Stat. 1100 (1950),
20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1964).
42. 30 FED. REG. 11810, 11813 (1965).
43. It is the intention of the proposed legislation not to prescribe the specific
types of programs or projects that will be required in school districts. Rather,
such matters are left to the discretion and judgment of the local educational
agencies since educational needs and requirements for strengthening educational
310
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inform the reader of all the benefits to be given to private school stu-
dents,4" it is unlikely that the title will be held unconstitutional on its face.
The statute's constitutionality will probably be tested in terms of the pro-
grams enacted under it.
The dual enrollment program, frequently referred to as shared time,
permits private school students to attend classes in a public school to re-
ceive instruction in secular courses part of each day or week.4" One could
argue that the parochial school as well as the child is benefitted by the
program. The use of public school facilities and free academic instruc-
tion preserves parochial school funds for religious activities. Under the
true welfare benefit reading of Everson this program is invalid because
the students receive an education or the use of recreational facilities
which is an ordinary cost of education to be defrayed by the private
school. But this is not the kind of case to which one can apply the child
benefit theory because each state is obliged to educate its children.46
There appears to be no practical reason why this may not be done on a
part time basis.
opportunities for educationally deprived elementary and secondary school pupils
will vary from State to State and district to district.
S. REP. No. 146, 89th CoxG., 1st SEss. 9 (1965). The Committee received testimony
as to the kinds of programs possible for educationally deprived students. Some examples
are additional teaching personnel to reduce class size; supplementary instructional
materials; classes for talented elementary students; remedial programs (especially, in
reading and mathematics); supplementary health and food services; science and
reading laboratories; programmed instruction; financial assstance to needy high
school students; and college coaching classes. See S. REP. No. 146, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 10-11 (1965).
44. The act is also vague as to the kinds of benefits the public school children will
receive. Section 205(a) (1), Title I, 79 Stat. 30 (1965), amendirg 64 Stat. 1100 (1950),
20 U.S.C. §§ 236-244 (1964) provides that before approving an application the state
must determine:
• . . that payments under this title will be used for programs and projects
(including the acquisition of equipment and where necessary the construction
of school facilities) (A) which are designed to meet the special educational
needs (Emphasis added.) of educationally deprived school children in school
attendance areas having high concentrations of children from low-income
families and (B) which are of sufficient size, scope, and quality to give
reasonable promise of substantial progress towards meeting tIose needs and....
45. Prior to the passage of the act, shared time programs have been used in some
states on a small scale. The program is expected to be widely used under the act to
assure the participation of private school pupils in some publicly sponsored educational
programs. See 30 FED. REG. 13138 § 118.1(g) (1965) defining "dual enrollment." For
two brief discussions of shared time programs see BLANSHARD, RELIGION AND THE
ScHooLs 178-81 (1963); and see also KATz, RELIGION AND A:ERICAN CO NSTITUTIONS
78-79 (1963).
46. See IND. CoNsT. art. VIII § 1; N.Y. CoNsT. art. XI § :; ILL. CoNsT. art. VIII§ 1; F.S.A. Co~sT. art XII § 1; DEL. CoNs'. art X § 1; see also BLANSHAID, op. cit.
supra note 45, at 180.
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There are certain factors which could weaken the effectiveness of
dual enrollment and others which may render a particular program con-
stitutionally invalid in its implementation. Most states' constitutions are
literally more restrictive in their religious prohibitions than the first
amendment." For example, after Everson several states have held simi-
lar bus transportation laws invalid within the meaning of their constitu-
tion or interpretation of statutes. 8 These state decisions are significant
because Title I is permissive rather than mandatory in regard to dual en-
rollment. Thus, a state could invalidate the shared time program and
thereby weaken one of the primary means of effecting the objectives of
the act."
A state which permits shared time may be faced with the problem of
transporting the parochial school student to the public school.5" Some
state courts can look to the precedents in their decisions invalidating the
public transportation of private students to parochial schools.5" They
may extend these decisions to invalidate inter-school transportation serv-
ices for private school students. However, this conclusion is not neces-
sary, because once a state permits dual enrollment the private student
should be entitled to the same advantages as the public school student in
travelling to and from the public institution. To hold otherwise creates
the paradox of permitting the use of public funds to educate private
47. See note 127 in-fra and accompanying text.
48. Mathews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska 1961) ; Squires v. City of Augusta,
115 Me. 151, 153 A.2d 80 (1959) (statutory construction) ; McVey v. Hawkins, 364
Mo. 44, 258 S.W.2d 927 (1953) ; Board of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963) ;
School Dist. v. Houghton, 387 Pa. 236, 128 A.2d 58 (1956) (statutory construction);
Visser v. School Dist. No. 506, 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198 (1949) ; State v. Nusbaum,
17 Wisc. 2d 148, 115 N.W.2d 761 (1962). See contra Snyder v. Town of Newton,
147 Conn. 374, 161 A.2d 770 (1960), appeal dismissed, 365 U.S. 299 (1961) ; Quinn v.
School Comm., 332 Mass. 410, 125 N.E.2d 410 (1955) (statutory construction). For an
excellent discussion of these cases see FELLMAN, op. cit. supra note 19, at 74-83. For
cases dealing with textbook statutes see Dickman v. School Dist., 223 Ore. 347, 366
P2d 533 (1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 823 (1962) (unconstitutional) ; Chance v. Miss.
State Textbook Rating and Purchasing Bd., 190 Miss. 453, 200 So. 706 (1961)
(constitutional).
49. Two state Attorney Generals have expressed the opinion that a dual enroll-
ment program would violate their state constitutions. Letter from Harvey Dickerson,
At. Gen. of Nevada, Nov. 15, 1965, to Byron Stetler, Superintendent of Public In-
struction, Nevada; and Letter from Louis Lefkowitz, Att. Gen. of New York, July
15, 1965, to Dr. James Allen, Jr., Commissioner of Education, New York; contra
opinion expressed in a Letter from Arthur Sills, Att. Gen. of New Jersey, Nov. 29,
1965, to Hon. Frederick M. Raubinger, Commissioner of Education, New Jersey.
50. It is quite possible that there will be large distances between the public and
parochial schools. The Attorney General of Oklahoma is of the opinion that while
shared time is permitted under the state constitution, public funds may not be used to
defray the transporting of private school children from the parochial school to the
public school. Letter from W. J. Monroe, for the Att. Gen. of Oklahoma, Sept. 16,
1965, to Hon. Oliver Hodge, Superintendent of Education, Oklahoma.
51. See cases cited at note 48 supra.
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school students, but prohibiting payments to transport those pupils to re-
ceive the education.
Two other aspects of shared time deserve brief mention. First, a
school district's program could be unconstitutional if a religious group
dominates the operations of a local educational agency. 2 It is possible
when planning the program that public authorities may as a result of
religious pressures within the community, acquiesce to every demand of
the church group. Perhaps this could violate a principle announced in
Everson which said religious groups cannot get involved in governmental
affairs." Second, if a court recognizes that one ha 3 a right to receive
a part time education in a public school, it may violate the fourteenth
amendment to deny one this right. 4
The other kinds of services mentioned in Title I and in the Rules
and Regulations," except perhaps "special educational services" including
guidance and remedial programs, easily fall within the meaning of a true
welfare benefit and thus can be sustained on the authority of Everson.
These services are not associated with the educational function of a school
and are not the traditional kinds of educational costs. Therapeutic and
health services are not educational costs. The child is the beneficiary of
the program regardless of his relationship to the school. The only rela-
tionship between the child, the school, and the benefit is that the school is
a convenient place at which the state may provide these services. Further,
the location at which these services are available to th private school stu-
dent, whether on public or private premises, is immaterial.
However, the constitutionality of "special educational" programs
will depend on their nature (an educational cost or not) and the location
at which they are given. The subsequent discussion assumes we are con-
sidering a program which provides public support for a traditional edu-
cational cost such as instruction in mathematics or rermedial reading. As
discussed in connection with dual enrollment, if the program is offered
in the public school," a consideration of the child tenefit theory is in-
applicable because of the state's obligation to educate its children. But
when the services are provided in the private school, the state's overrid-
52. See BLANSHARD, op. cit. supra note 45, at 180.
53. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
54. In sustaining a shared time program, the Court, in the alternative, could hold
that the program is permissive under the state constitution and avoid the issue of
whether one has an inherent right to a part time education. Address by Reverend
Robert F. Drinan, Church-State Accommodation And The 19";5 Federal Primary and
Secondary School Assistance Act, Fourth Annual School Law Conference, Miami
University, Ohio, May 7, 1965.
55. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text.
56. See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
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ing obligation is not present to negate the use of this theory. The act
prohibits the use of funds to give religious instruction, payment of pri-
vate school teachers' or other employees' salaries, and vesting of title to
equipment in private persons." Despite the prohibitions, when publicly
paid teachers are employed to give academic instruction in private schools,
it is arguable that funds are released for religious activities.
The Rules and Regulations authorize public personnel to enter onto
the private school premises and permit the use of mobile equipment for
the duration of the program. The former is permitted when the services
are not normally provided for by the private school, and the latter is al-
lowed to assure the success of the program.58 One could argue that since
the services were not previously provided by the parochial school, there
are no additional funds to be released for sectarian activities. Conversely,
the reason funds might not have been allocated for this particular educa-
tional service is that the private school utilized a large percentage of its
funds to advance religious activities. The act provides federal funds to
finance educational needs which the parochial school might have been re-
quired to finance. Thus, the private school is strengthened in its re-
57. See note 30 supra and accompanying text. The Rules and Regulations, 30 FED.
REo. 11810, 11813 (1965) provides in § 116.19(d) :
. . . Provisions for special educational services or arrangements for educa-
tionally deprived children enrolled in private schools shall not include the paying
of salaries of teachers or other employees of private schools, nor shall they
include the placing of equipment other than mobile or portable equipment on
private school premises or the construction of facilities for private schools.
and § 116.20(a) provides:
Each application by a local educational agency shall provide assurance that
the control of Federal funds granted pursuant to the application, and title to
property acquired with such funds, shall not inure to the benefit of any private
school 'but shall be in a public agency for the uses and purposes provided in Title
II of the Act, and that a public agency will administer such funds and property
for carrying out the purpose of the project.
58. 30 FED. REG. 11810, 11813 (1965):
§ 116.19 Participation by children enrolled in private schools.
(a) . . .
(b) ...
(c) . . .
(d) Public school personnel may be made available to other than public school
facilities only to provide specialized services which the local educational agency
determines are designed to meet the special educational needs of educationally
deprived children and only where such specialized services are not normally
provided by the non-public school. Mobile or portable equipment may be
temporarily placed on private school premises for such period of time, within
the life of the current project for which the equipment is intended to be used,
as is necessary for the successful participation in that project by educationally
deprived children enrolled in private schools, at the end of which period of
time such equipment shall be removed from such premises. . ..
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ligious activities by not decreasing its expenditures for the sectarian
programs.
Further, assuming that to pay a parochial schoolteacher's salary is
unconstitutional,"0 Congress may have placed form over substance in per-
mitting publicly paid teachers to give academic instruction in sectarian
schools. There is no substantial difference between paying the private
schoolteacher and paying the public schoolteacher to instruct in the
parochial school. This method is a distinction without a difference be-
cause in both cases the public purse bears the expense. Further, when a
public employee serves in the private school, the public school system is
deprived of the services of that particular public servant. The only pos-
sible difference in the manner of payment is one of control and curricu-
lum. Since the public personnel is not a member of the private school
faculty, the school can only exert a minimum amount of control over such
person's activities."0
Since Titles I and III provide similar services, " the preceding dis-
cussion of Title I is applicable to Title III. However. Title III raises two
additional problems. First, section 304(a) requires that before a local
educational agency may receive a grant for supplementary educational
services, it must assure that "persons broadly representative of the cul-
tural and educational resources" within the area to be served, have par-
ticipated in planning the program and will actively participate in its
59. This issue has never been decided by the Court, but it is likely that direct
payments with public funds of parochial school teachers' salaries could not be sustained
on the authority of Everson. See note 85 infra.
60. This control argument is significant with respect to the religious activities
in a parochial school's program. The private school cannot reauire the public teachers
to conform to certain practices such as reading the Bible and wearing religious attire.
61. Section 303, 79 Stat. 39, 40, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 843 (Supp. 1965) provides
in part that grants may be used for
(a) planning for and taking other steps leading to the development of programs
designed to provide supplementary activities and services described in
paragraph (b), including pilot projects designed to tcst the effectiveness
of plans so developed; and
(b) the establishment, maintenance, and operation of procrams, including the
lease and construction of necessary facilities and the acquisition of necessary
equipment, designed to enrich the programs of local elementary and sec-
ondary schools and to offer a diverse range of educztional experience to
persons of varying talents and needs by providing supplementary educa-
tional services and activities. ...
Under this title the assistance to be given is not determined by the number of education-
ally deprived school children in a school district but depends on other factors such as the
population of a state and the geographic distribution of population within the state.
See § 304(b) (2). According to rule 118.11 in 30 FED. REG. 13138, 13139 (1965) some of
the programs may be offered on private school premises. Also, portable equipment
may be placed on these premises for the duration of the program.
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operation. 2 The act defines "cultural and educational resources" to in-
clude non-profit private schools.6"
This section makes the institution and not the person determinative
of the representation. The representative of a religious school is per-
mitted to participate in planning and operating a public educational pro-
gram. This could be an impermissible fusion of government with re-
ligion which caused the Court to invalidate the recital of a state created
school prayer in Engle.64 The principle in Everson, that the "Establish-
ment Clause" prohibits the participation of religious groups in govern-
mental affairs,6" may also be violated. This does not mean one cannot
participate in a governmental function because of his religious belief, but
that the participation may exceed the boundaries of the first amendment
when one serves as the appointed representative of a church or religiously
oriented institution.
Second, section 304(b) (3) (B) provides as a condition for receiving
the Commissioner's approval of the application, provisions must be made
for the participation of children enrolled in non-profit private schools
having the same needs as the other children in the project area.6" Further,
in illustrating the kinds of programs contemplated by Title III, section
303 (b) (5) makes certain types of services available to "public and other
non-profit schools."6  These sections may even be inconsistent with a
62. Section 304(a), 79 Stat. 41, 20 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (Supp. 1965).
A grant under this title for a program of supplementary educational services
may be made to a local educational agency or agencies, but only if there is
satisfactory assurance that in the planning of that program there has been, and
in the establishing and carrying out of that program there will be, participation
of persons broadly representative of the cultural and educational resources of
the area to be served. For the purposes of this section, the term "cultural and
educational resources" includes State educational agencies, institutions of higher
education, nonprofit private schools (Emphasis added.), public and nonprofit
private agencies such as libraries, museums, musical and artistic organiza-
tions, educational radio and television, and other cultural and educational re-
sources ...
63. Section 304(a), 79 Stat. 41, 42, 20 U.S.C.A. § 844(a) (Supp. 1965). The
phrase also includes state educational agencies, institutions of higher education, and
public and non-profit private agencies. See note 62 supra.
64. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
65. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
66. Section 304(b) (3) (B), 79 Stat. 43, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 844(b) (3) (B) (Supp.
1965):
. .. that, to the extent consistent with the number of children enrolled in non-
profit private schools in the area to be served whose educational needs are of
the type which the supplementary educational activities and services provided
under the program are to meet, provision has been made for the participation
of such children. ...
67. Section 303(b) (5) ; 79 Stat. 41, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 843(b) (5) (Supp. 1965).
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broad interpretation of the child benefit theory. The title limits the
participation of private school students to those attending private non-
profit schools. 8 Titles I and II do not make this distinction within the
category of private school students.69 Obviously, under Title III, not all
school children in the project area will be benefitted, but only those at-
tending schools not operated for profit. The distinction causes the kind
of school one attends to determine who is to be beiiefitted. Thus it is
easier to argue that the school substantially is the recipient of the benefit.7"
68. Section 304(b) (3) (B), 79 Stat. 43, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 841, 844(b) (3) (B) (Supp.
1965). See note 66 supra.
69. See note 10 supra and accompanying text, and note 72 infra and accompanying
text. As originally proposed, Title II provided benefits for students and teachers
attending non-profit private schools. See Hearings Before tlhe General Subcommittee
on Education, 89 CONG., 1 Sess., part 1 at 1 (1965). In explaiaing why the amendment
was made, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare stated:
The purpose of this amendment was to assure that under title II, which
is designed to benefit children and not schools, certain ciildren would not be
discriminated against merely because they attend a privote vocational, trade,
or other school which meets State standards but is operated for profit.
S. Rep. No. 146, 89 CONG., 1 Sess. 25 (1965).
70. In Everson, the New Jersey statute and ordinance distinguished between non-
profit private school students and private school students. Se' 330 U.S. 1, 3 at n. 1:
Whenever in any district there are children living remote from any school-
house, the board of education of the district may make rules and contracts for
the transportation of such children to and from school, including the transporta-
tion of school children to and from school other than, a public school, except
such a school as is operated for profit in whole or in port .... (Emphasis
added.).
The petitioner did not challenge this part of the statute as violating the Equal Protection
Clause of the fourteenth amendment. Mr. Justice Jackson uscd the distinction between
the kind of schools to show that the school was aided by the le islation. See Jackson, J.,
dissenting at 330 U.S. 1, 20-21.
The New Jersey Act in question makes the character o;" the school, not the
needs of the children, determine the eligibility of parents to reimbursement. The
Act permits payment for transportation to parochial schools or public schools
but prohibits it to private schools operated in whole or in part for profit.
Children often are sent to private schools because their parents feel that they
require more individual instruction than public schools can provide, or because
they are backward or defective and need special attentioi. If all children of
the state were objects of impartial solicitude, no reason is obvious for denying
transportation reimbursement to students of this class, fcr these often are as
needy and as worthy as those who go to public or parochial schools. Refusal
to reimburse those who attend such schools is understandable only in the light
of a purpose to aid the schools, because the state might well abstain from aiding
a profit-making private enterprise. Thus, under the Act a id resolution brought
to us by this case, children are classified according to thz, schools they attend
and are to be aided if they attend the public schools or private Catholic schools,
and they are not allowed to be aided if they attend privote secular schools or
private religious schools of other faiths. (Emphasis added.).
As a practical matter the omission of private school students attending schools operated
for profit will not affect many students. In the school year 1961-62 there were 106,825
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The provisions in Title II are more specific than the other titles in
that textbooks, library materials, and other instructional materials will
be made available to teachers and students attending elementary and
secondary schools.71 The provisions assume that the child and not the
school is the beneficiary of the services."2 The validity of these provi-
sions may depend on whether Cochran is controlling." Further, upon a
first reading of the title one can note provisions indicating it is difficult
for the school to receive benefits from the services.
Title to the books is to remain in a public agency, and public authori-
ties are to determine which books are to be made available. 4 Certainly
the books will neither have a sectarian character" nor be used in religious
instruction." This title contemplates that the textbooks will not be given
to the parochial schools but will merely be loaned to the student or
teacher.7 Furthermore, the grants may not be used to substitute existing
funds ordinarily used to procure like materials, but are permitted to sup-
plement or increase them whenever possible.7 Thus, the title envisions
students attending non-church related private elementary schools as compared with
4,520,212 students enrolled in church-related elementary schools. During the same
period there were 133,126 students enrolled in non-church related private secondary
schools and 976,317 students enrolled in church-related non-public schools. The writer
assumes that church-related schools are not operated for profit whereas non-church
related non-public schools may or may not be operated for profit. Hence only a small
percentage of private school students will not receive the benefits from the supple-
mentary services. See U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION,
Digest of Educational Statistics 18 (1965).
71. Section 201(a), 79 Stat. 36, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 821-840 (Supp. 1965).
72. Section 201 (a), 79 Stat. 36, 20 U.S.C.A. § 82(a) (Supp. 1965).
The Commissioner shall carry out during the fiscal year ending . . ., a program
for making grants for the acquisition of school library resources, textbooks,
and other printed and published instructional materials for the use of children
and teachers (Emphasis added.) in public and private elementary and secondary
schools.
73. See note 18 supra.
74. Section 205, 79 Stat. 38, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 821, 825(a), (b). (Supp. 1965).
75. Obviously, if public authorities must approve the use of the books, they cannot
permit books overemphasizing religion for use in a public school. The private school
children may only receive the same kind of books which are used in the public school.
76. Section 605, 79 Stat. 58, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 881, 885 (Supp. 1965). See note 30
supra.
77. 30 FED. REG. 11817, 11819 (1965),
§ 1117.5 Methods and terms of availability.
(a) lit general. The state plan shall set forth the methods and terms by which
the school library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials acquired
under the State plan will be made available for the use of children and teachers
in the schools of the State. It shall assure that funds provided under Title II of
the Act will not inure to the enrichment or benefit of any institution by pro-
viding that (1) library resources, textbooks, and other instructional materials
are to be made available to children and teachers and not to institutions; (2)
such materials are made available on a loan basis only . . .
78. Section 203(a) (5), 79 Stat. 38, 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 821, 823(a) (5) (Supp. 1965).
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a program similar to a central library service through which textbooks
and other materials are distributed to students on a temporary basis."9
Purchasing textbooks for students is undoubtedly an educational
cost and cannot be sustained as a true welfare benefit. A school's pri-
mary function is to educate pupils, and a textbook is a necessary tool to-
wards furthering that goal. Although the books are technically loaned
to the students it is difficult to imagine that the school is not receiving a
substantial benefit. The fact that title remains in a public agency con-
fuses the issue because it is likely that the books will be used by private
school students for the life of the book.8" Although the public agency
will control the use of the books and perhaps recall them at any time, this
method of distribution differs from making a loan which must be repaid
within a certain period.8 Furthermore, as a practical matter some con-
trol must necessarily be given to the private school officials to implement
the distribution of the textbooks to their students.
Section 401 "section 2 (b)" 82 in Title IV raises a more controversial
church-state issue than the preceding titles. The section permits the
Commissioner of Education to make grants to public and other non-profit
universities and colleges to assist them in providing training in research in
the field of education. 2 No grant can be made to advance training in sec-
tarian instruction or to institutions whose programs are specifically de-
signed to prepare students for religious careers.8 4 The formal operation
of Title IV is unlike Titles I, II, and III because federal funds are directly
given to church affiliated colleges or universities for non-religious edu-
cational programs.
79. The public officials could either create an actual depository from which
students and teachers would "check out" books or, by distributing the books to students
in the private school the principle is conceptually analagous tc the library system.
80. The Rules and Regulations in defining school library resources, textbooks,
and other printed and published materials require that these materials are expected
to last more than one year. See 30 FaD. REG. 11817, 11818 § 117.1(i) (1965). In regard
to textbooks, it is likely that they will be used for the life of the book because it is
impractical to relocate them once they are made available withia a certain school.
81. In making a loan, the creditor expects to be paid the orincipal with interest at
a subsequent time. The method of loaning textbooks differs because the book when
returned will be in a "used" condition and be worth less than its original value.
82. Section 401, 79 Stat. 44, 20 U.S.C.A. § 331a(b) (Supp. 1965), amending 68
Stat. 533 (1954), 20 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
83. Section 401, 79 Stat. 44, 20 U.S.C.A. § 331a(b) (Stipp. 1965), amending 68
Stat. 533 (1954), 20 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
84. Section 401, 79 Stat. 45, 20 U.S.C.A. § 331a(b) (Supp. 1965), amending 68
Stat. 533 (1954), 20 U.S.C. § 332 (1964), providing in part, "No grant shall be made
under this subsection for training in sectarian instruction or, for work to 'be done in an
institution, or a department or branch of an institution, whosc program is specifically
for the education of students to prepare them to become ministers of religion or to
enter upon some other religious vocation or to prepare them to teach theological
subjects."
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Research in the field of education should be considered as an educa-
tional cost to an institution of higher learning because schools should
continuously innovate educational methods. Such a categorization is per-
haps questionable because few institutions have undertaken such research
programs without outside aid. Even conceding the latter point, it may
be difficult to sustain these direct grants on the authority of Everson and
Cochran. In both cases, the Court emphasized the fact that the schools
did not receive public funds.85 However, if the Court considers that this
title provides true welfare benefits, the method of giving the funds
should be irrelevant.
There are some reasons to distinguish between direct grants for non-
religious educational purposes to church-related institutions of higher
education and direct grants for similar objectives to elementary and sec-
ondary parochial schools. First, apparently many church affiliated col-
leges and universities have lost their religious character."5 Secondly, as
a practical consideration, today nearly one-half of all colleges and univer-
sities are private institutions.8" Finally, it is likely that college-age stu-
dents are more mature and less susceptible to religious indoctrination
than primary and secondary private school students.88 But despite these
reasons, the Court may not be persuaded that these differences are strong
enough to overcome the proscriptions in the "Establishment Clause."8
The examination, thus far, has concentrated on the controversial
provisions in the Education Act within the authority of the only two
Supreme Court decisions involving the issues of public financial aid in
some form to the private school student or to the school. It is likely that
several programs available under the act may not be sustained under the
true welfare benefit approach to the first amendment.9" However, the
Court has decided several other cases concerning the "Establishment
85. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) at 18, Black, J., "The state
contributes no money to the schools. It does not support them." And see also Cochran
v. Louisiana Bd. of Educ., 281 U.S. 370 (1930) at 375, Hughes, J., "The schools, how-
ever, are not the beneficiaries of these appropriations. They obtain nothing from them."
86. See KAuPER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 116.
87. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, Statistical Abstract of
the United States 129 (1965). However, there are statistics that show more than one-
half of higher educational institutions are private institutions. See U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, OFFICE OF EDUCATION, Education Directory 1964-
1965 11 (1965).
88. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Memorandmon On the Impact
of the First Amenent to the Constitution upon Federal Aid to Education, 50 GEo. L.J.
349, 378 (1961).
89. A decision on the provisions in Title IV will be relevant to any future litiga-
tion arising under the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 which provides funds
to church-related colleges for secular purposes. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
90. See text accompanying notes 40-89 supra.
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Clause." These cases do not directly involve public financial aid to a
parochial school or student, but should be examined to determine if the
Court can apply constitutional principles to sustain the entire act.
In Bradfield v. Roberts91 the Court sustained a congressional appro-
priation to a hospital operated by Roman Catholics in Washington, D. C.
The funds were to be used in constructing two isolating buildings. This
appropriation was challenged as a law respecting the establishment of
religion because a religious order managed the hospital. The Court re-
jected this contention because the hospital's charter proved that the cor-
poration was secular and the management's religious beliefs did not alter
the corporation's non-sectarian character.2 The Court also relied on the
fact that there was to be no discrimination based on religious beliefs in
admitting patients into the new buildings.9"
Some writers cite this case as support for the proposition that public
financial aid to parochial schools for specific non-sectarian purposes is
constitutional. 4  Bradfield is distinguishable on its facts from the kind
of case which is likely to arise under the Education Act. Favoring the
act's constitutionality is that, excepting Title IV, there are no direct grants
to a religious institution, and the funds are used for non-sectarian pur-
poses. But there are two differences between aiding a hospital and sup-
porting a parochial school or its students. Unlike the hospital's secular
corporate charter in Bradfield, parochial schools are created specifically
for religious as well as secular purposes. Furthermore, the parochial
school may choose their own students, and have tie tendency to select
students professing the beliefs of the Church which supports the school.
In deciding two released time cases, the Court reached opposite re-
sults. In McCullom v. Bd. of Educ."5 the Court invalidated a program
which at the parents' request released children from classes during the
regular school day to classrooms within the school building for religious
training by teachers provided for by a Church. There were two reasons
for this decision. First, a public building was used for religious instruc-
tion, and second, the state's law requiring compulsory attendance at school
increased the success of the religious activity by providing students for
91. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
92. Id. at 293.
93. Id. at 299.
94. Legal Department of the National Catholic Confereace, The Constitutionality
of the Inclusion of Church-Related Schools in Federal Aid to Education, 50 GEo. L.J.
397, 415 (1961); Manning, Aid to Education-Federal Fashion, 29 FORDHAm L. Rv.
495, 513-15 (1961).
95. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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the program.9" But in Zorach v. Clauson 7 the Court sustained the re-
leased time program because the religious instruction was given at a place
other than the public school.
This distinction between the two cases appears tenuous because in
Zorach the state supported the religious program through some form of
coercion. Coercion was present in Zorach because the public school sys-
tem contributed to the success of the program. Absentee reports were
filed with school officials for non-attendance at the religious instruction.
Students not participating in the program were required to do other work
instead of following the regular school schedule.98 Apparently the pres-
ence of coercion was immaterial to Mr. Justice Douglas who, speaking
for the majority, said that since we are a religious people, we should ac-
commodate religious activities.99 He was not upset that the public school
adjusted its schedule to the advantage of religious groups. In fact he
said that the failure to make such accommodations in certain cases would
be state hostility toward religion, which is not within the spirit of the
first amendment." 0
Zorach could have far-reaching consequences because the Court sus-
tained a program which permitted a state to lend some support to re-
ligious instruction. By definition of released time, the program neces-
sarily advances religion.10' Zorach could be used as authority to sustain
the act in its entirety because the federal government is only supporting
secular education instead of a religious activity, although religion may be
an incidental beneficiary. If the first amendment permits state support
of a religious program, perhaps federal support of a program with a pri-
mary objective to improve education is not barred. But reliance on
Zorach is weakened by reversing the very argument which supports the
validity of the act. In Zorach the issue was religious instruction, where-
as the act involves a financial appropriation. This latter distinction
seems to have made a difference to even Justice Douglas on two occa-
sions."02
In the Sunday Closing Law cases' 3 and in Abington School Dist. v.
96. Id. at 212.
97. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
98. Id. at 308.
99. Id. at 313.
100. Id. at 314.
101. The purpose of releasing the students is that they may obtain a religious
education.
102. See note 27 supra and note 125 intfra and accompanying text.
103. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher
Super Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961) ; Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown v. McGinley,
366 U.S. 582 (1961); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961). These statutes were
challenged on other points besides the religious issue.
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Schemnpp, °4 the Pennsylvania Bible reading case, the Court used an ap-
proach which sustained legislation incidentally beneficial to religion. Par-
ticularly in McGowan v. Marylaul ' the Court emphasized that the Sun-
day closing law was not an establishment of religion because the law no
longer served a religious purpose." 6 The fact that religions which con-
sider Sunday as their day of rest were benefitted was immaterial. This
is a strong case because a large number of churches could be benefitted
by the legislation.
The standards were more clearly defined in Sch ?mpp.07 The Court
invalidated a Pennsylvania statute which required the reading of verses
from the Holy Bible without comment at the opening of each school day,
even though a child could be excused from reading or attending the reci-
tals upon the written request of his parent or guardian.' This decision
did not come as a surprise after Engle.' But in Schempp, the majority
determined the unconstitutionality of the statute by examining its pur-
pose and primary effect. Mr. Justice Clark said:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement
or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment
Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion."'
Applying these standards the Court held the prayer recitals were a re-
ligious exercise which naturally advanced religion.1 '
104. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) ; also Murray v. Cur-
lett, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) was decided the same day. In the latter case the Board of School
Commissioners of Baltimore had adopted a rule providing for daily opening exercises
in the public schools consisting of the "reading, without comirent, of a chapter in the
Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's Prayer." A parent and a child, who were
atheists, claimed that these exercises threatened their religious liberty.
105. 366 U.S. 420.
106. 366 U.S. 420 at 446-49. The Court conceded that the Maryland Sunday
closing statute was originally enacted to serve a religious purpose. But the Justices
concluded that today the purpose is no longer religious because the legislature was
requiring one day of rest each week to benefit the general welfare.
107. 374 U.S. 203.
108. Id. at 205-208.
109. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The Court held invalid the recitation
each school day of a prayer composed by the New York State Board of Regents in the
public schools. In Stein v. Oshinsky, 348 F.2d 999 (2d Cir. 1965) the court upheld the
order of a school principal requiring teachers to prevent the recital of prayers which
were voluntarily initiated by children before drinking their milk and eating cookies
in the morning and afternoon sessions.
110. 374 U.S. 203 at 222.
111. 374 U.S. 203 at 226.
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The Schempp analysis could be used to sustain all the provisions in
the Education Act. Clearly, the legislative purpose is to improve the
American educational system. The preamble states the purpose as "An
Act to strengthen and improve educational quality and educational op-
portunities in the Nation's elementary and secondary schools. ' 112  In
support of that object, the Congressional Committee reports indicate that
Title I was induced by a strong correlation "between conditions of pov-
erty and lack of educational development and poor academic perform-
ance.""'  Furthermore, in enacting Title II, Congress had recognized the
"importance of well-stocked libraries, the services of professional li-
brarians, and up-to-date textbooks and related materials."" 4 The schools
needing these educational resources were, prior to the act's passage, pre-
cisely the institutions which were unable to afford them."'
In ascertaining whether the primary effect of the act advances re-
ligion, reasonable minds may differ. Apparently, when the government
finances educational costs, a parochial school is benefitted in some way
because it is partially relieved of its burden to fulfill its students' educa-
tional needs. The amount of additional funds to be used in financing re-
ligious activities is a difficult problem of proof. Perhaps the increased
religious expenditures attributed as the act's consequence, will only be
minimal in actual monetary value. But despite actual statistics, even in-
cidental benefits to religion may be equally as primary in effect as edu-
cational improvements. A strengthened secular department in a paro-
chial school can increase enrollments by providing a more attractive pro-
gram. Furthermore, federal subsidizing of educational costs could en-
courage the construction of more parochial schools in which children can
avail themselves of a religious education.
Conceding that the act has a primary effect which is religiously
neutral, the Court should be reluctant to apply the test announced in
Schempp to a case involving federal financial aid to benefit parochial
school students. Recitation of a school prayer is conceptually different
from financing educational improvements for private school children.
The former activity was attacked because the activity itself was a re-
ligious exercise." 6 Even in McGowan the Sunday closing legislation was
challenged as using a religious mean, i.e., affording one day of rest per
112. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
113. SEN. RE. No. 146, 89th CONG., 1st Sess. 5 (1965); H.R. REP. No. 143, 89th
CoNG., 1st Sess. 2 (1965).
114. SEN. REP. No. 146, 89th CONG., 1st Sess. 16 (1965).
115. Ibid.
116. See notes 104 supra and 107 supra and accompanying text.
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week." " The Education Act does not employ religious means to achieve
its educational objectives. In the financial cases, the constitutional attack
is directed at the effect of such aid because the purposc, will almost always
be secular." 8  To use the purpose and effect test in these cases would be
nothing more than implementing a mechanical method to determine an
enactment's validity.
The new standard is different from the child benefit or general wel-
fare principles. The purpose and primary effect analysis would permit
Congress to finance directly religious institutions for secular purposes
whereas the earlier principles are more restrictive. But the Court in
Schempp, after stating the new test, cited Everson as well as McGowan."9
Perhaps the Court implied that it will interpret the first amendment as
proscribing aid to religion as such instead of restricting all direct aids to
religious institutions."'
However, Everson indicated that had the parochial school directly re-
ceived the funds to defray pupils' transportation costs, the program would
have been invalid. Recall that Justice Black in Everson and the majority
in Cochran emphasized the fact that the parochial schools did not receive
any funds.' 2' The Education Act only provides for direct grants of fi-
nancial aid to private schools in Title IV."'2 This brief discussion merely
points to the logical consequences of applying the principles in Schempp
and reconciling them with the reasoning underlying Everson and Cochran.
There is yet another weakness with the purpose and primary effect
test. It is difficult to reconcile this new test with the specific holding in
Zorach. Obviously, the released time program had a religious purpose
and a primary effect advancing religion. The Court in Schempp did not
recognize this inconsistency as they cited Zorach. with approval in review-
ing all the cases interpreting the "Establishment Clause.""'
Perhaps justice Douglas, who wrote the majority opinion in Zorach,
was not concerned with the above inconsistency, because he would not
apply the purpose and effect analysis to cases involving some form of fi-
nancial aid to religious institutions. The Justice's concurring opinion
117. 366 U.S. 420.
118. This statement is qualified because the government or a state might con-
ceivably enact legislation granting funds to support religious activities. If such is the
case, the means are still non-religious and emphasis will be placed on the enactment's
effect. Even in this type of case it is unnecessary to apply the purpose and primary
effect test.
119. 374 U.S. 203 at 222.
120. KAuPER, op. cit. supra note 22, at 62, 66.
121. See note 85 stupra and accompanying text.
122. Section 401, 79 Stat. 44, 20 U.S.C.A. § 331a(b) (Supp. 1965), amending 68
Stat. 533 (1964), 20 U.S.C. § 332 (1964).
123. 374 U.S. 203 at 213.
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in Schempp reaffirmed his views stated in Engle.2' His primary reason
for invalidating the Pennsylvania statute was that the use of the state's
public facilities and teachers' time constituted financial aid to religion.
He declared that financial aid to a religious institution for a specific non-
sectarian purpose is unconstitutional. Financing a religious institution in
any of its activities, to Justice Douglas, strengthens the institution in
proselytizing because funds are released for the religious activities. 2 '
Thus, according to this reasoning, Douglas would hold Title IV and at
least the non-true welfare benefits in the preceding titles in violation of
the first amendment.
26
Assuming that the act is constitutional under the first amendment,
as previously mentioned, the interpretation of restrictive religious pro-
visions in state constitutions could prevent the implementation of the
programs contemplated by the legislation in some states. Several state
constitutions prohibit the spending of public funds which directly or in-
directly benefit religious institutions or schools.'27 Where state law pro-
124. See note 27 supra.
125. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, Douglas, J., concurring
at 227, 229:
The most effective way to establish any institution is to finance it; and this
truth is reflected in the appeals by church groups for public funds to finance
their religious schools. Financing a church either in its strictly religious ac-
tivities or in its other activities is equally ioconstitutional, as I understand the
Establishment Clause. (Emphasis added.). Budgets for one activity may be
technically separable from 'budgets for others. But the institution is an in-
separable whole, a living organism, which is strengthened in proselytizing when
it is strengthened in any department by contributions from other than its own
members.
126. Title IV finances church-related institutions in secular activities which
Douglas referred to as "other activities." Ibid. As regards educational costs which
may be provided in Titles I, II, and III, his reasoning in Schemnpp, ibid., and in Engle,
supra, note 27 would not permit such benefits to parochial school students.
127. The Oklahoma Constitution provides:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, donated, or
used, directly or indirectly (Emphasis added.) for the use, benefit, or support of
any sect, church, denomination, or system of religion, or for the use, benefit,
or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher or
dignitary, or sectarian institution, as such.
OK.LA. CoNsT. art. II, § 5. In Bd. of Educ. v. Antone, 384 P.2d 911 (Okla. 1963), the
court held the above constitutional provision prohibited the free transportation of
parochial school students to school. In a Letter from W. J. Monroe, First Asst.
Attorney General of Oklahoma, to the Hon. Oliver Iodge, Superintendent of the State
Department of Education, Sept. 16, 1965, the Attorney General's office expressed the
opinion that the following programs would be prohibited under the Oklahoma Con-
stitution: special personnel, such as guidance counselors, social workers, who are
employed by a school district providing services to eligible pupils in a parochial school;
mobile units serving children enrolled in a parochial school; the use of equipment,
books, and other kinds of learning materials by pupils enrolled in a private school.
See also N.Y. CONST. art XI, § 3; VA. CoNsT. art. IV § 67, interpreted in Almond
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hibits the participation of parochial school students in the public educa-
tional programs, the funds cannot be used even for the public school
student.
However, a state can use either of two methods to resolve these
problems. First, a state constitutional amendment can permit the use of
federal funds to benefit the parochial school. Alternatively, a state court
could limit previous decisions, and interpret the state constitution as only
prohibiting the spending of state funds to benefit religious institutions.
Thus, a state could earmark the federal funds for use in financing the
portion of the program which calls for the participation of private school
students." 8 But the latter method is open to the criticism of placing
form over substance. While federal funds are collected from people re-
siding in all the states, this alternative circumvents the purpose of a par-
ticular state's prohibitions which is to prevent the use of public funds in
benefitting a parochial school or religious institution.": 9
v. Day, 197 Va. 419, 89 S.E.2d 851 (1955) (invalidating an appropriation of funds
for orphans of veterans as applied to defraying the cost of a parochial school education.)
128. This suggestion was made in a Letter from Louis Leikowitz, Atty. Gen. of
New York, July 15, 1965 to Dr. James E. Allen, Jr., Commissioner of Education,
New York:
I would add the observation that the Federal Act does not require the use of
state money or money of local educational agencies, or property or credit of a
state or a local subdivision thereof for the remedial programs (although it
does not guarantee that the Federal grants will pay the total cost of such
programs). The prohibition contained in Article XI, § 3 of the New York
Constitution would then, not be involved if the entire cost of the programs
in this State-including administration thereof-is paid out of Federal grants
without the use of any state or local property or credit or ptblic money at any
stage of the program, and if the Federal monies are at no time commingled
with monies of this state or of a local subdivision thereof.
In a Letter from Harvey Dickerson, Atty. Gen. of Nevada, Nove.nber 5, 1965, to Byron
Stetler, Superintendent of Public Instruction, Nevada, the following conclusion was
stated :
The State Department of Education may accept the funds appropriated by the
Congress of the United States for the implementation of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965, and make such funds available to the school
districts providing the moneys are designated as Federal moneys and kept in
separate funds so their expenditure can be identified at any time.
129. This position is expressed in a Letter from IV. J. Monroe, for the Atty. Gen. of
Oklahoma, September 16, 1965, to Hon. Oliver Hodge, Superirtendent of Education,
Oklahoma.
